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How Israel and the European far right tried to exploit Ceuta

Ceuta migrant crossing deaths

Thousands of people attempted to cross from Morocco into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta in recent days, and the crossing left dozens dead. What began as a humanitarian tragedy shifted almost immediately into a different kind of story, one dominated by political narratives rather than the deaths themselves.

Within hours of the crossings, social media filled with warnings of an “Islamic invasion.” The hashtag #StopIslam spread quickly across far-right networks. Politicians who have campaigned against immigration for years pointed to the events in Ceuta as evidence that Europe faces a civilizational challenge rather than a border management problem. Calls for stricter border enforcement followed, and Italy announced it would reintroduce border checks with Spain.

Investigators had not yet established the full circumstances of the crossings. Many of those who died had not yet been identified. Even so, prominent politicians, commentators and online campaigners had already settled on an interpretation of what happened.

Who benefits from the narrative

That speed of interpretation raises a straightforward question: who benefited from how Ceuta was framed in its immediate aftermath.

Europe’s nationalist parties gained fresh material to support existing warnings about migration and Islam. Anti-Muslim campaigners found another opportunity to present Muslim communities as an internal security threat. The events also fed into a broader argument advanced by the Israeli government and echoed by its political allies across Europe, one that links Muslim immigration, criticism of Israel and concerns about anti-Semitism together as a single interconnected issue.

That argument has grown more prominent since the war in Gaza began. As public criticism of Israel’s military campaign has intensified across Europe, Israeli officials have argued that shifting European attitudes stem less from the scale of destruction in Gaza and more from demographic change and the expanding political influence of Muslim communities.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has advanced this position in public remarks, describing Israel and Europe as partners facing a shared threat from radical Islam, mass migration and what he calls a broader challenge to Western civilization. In that framing, Israel is not only defending itself but defending Europe as well.

Political consequences

This framing carries significant political weight. It moves the conversation away from Israel’s conduct in Gaza and toward the identity of the people criticizing that conduct. Opposition to Israeli policy stops being treated primarily as a response to humanitarian catastrophe, occupation or violations of international law, and instead gets framed as a byproduct of demographic change and Muslim political influence.

Political leaders including Viktor Orban, Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen have adopted this narrative, combining strong support for Israel with hardline anti-immigration platforms. In Britain, figures such as Tommy Robinson have made a similar argument, presenting Israel as the front line in a wider civilizational struggle against Islam. Support for Israel has increasingly become tied to a broader political project built around opposition to immigration, multiculturalism and Islam.

The overlap between these movements is notable. For segments of Europe’s nationalist right, backing Israel offers a way to present themselves as defenders of Jewish communities while pursuing policies targeting Muslim minorities and migrants. For Israel’s current government, these same movements provide consistent diplomatic support and reinforce a narrative connecting criticism of Israel to broader public anxiety about migration and security. The two sets of political interests differ, but they reinforce each other in practice.

Security framing spreads

The effects extend beyond electoral politics. Across Europe, discussions about Palestine increasingly get filtered through the language of security. Demonstrations against the war in Gaza are sometimes treated less as political dissent and more as potential public order concerns. Muslim organizations get evaluated through a counter-extremism lens. Campaigns for Palestinian rights are, in some cases, presented not as movements rooted in human rights or international law but as vehicles for imported anti-Semitism.

None of this diminishes anti-Semitism as a real and persistent form of racism that requires ongoing attention wherever it appears. But there is a meaningful distinction between combating anti-Semitism and expanding its definition to include criticism of Israeli government policy. When that line blurs, legitimate political debate narrows, and a tool meant to identify genuine anti-Semitism risks losing effectiveness through overuse.

Viewed through this lens, Ceuta represents more than a migration story. The speed with which politicians, commentators and activists converged on the same interpretation suggests the political framework for understanding such events was already in place before Ceuta happened.

Whether that convergence was coordinated or emerged independently across separate political movements, the practical effect is the same. Fear of migration fuels hostility toward Muslim communities. That hostility makes solidarity with Palestinians appear suspect by association. Once support for Palestinian rights gets recast as a security concern rather than a political or humanitarian position, scrutiny of Israel’s actions becomes easier to dismiss.

A question of legitimacy

The stakes go beyond border policy. The underlying question concerns legitimacy: whose voices count as credible, whose suffering gets acknowledged, and which political causes are treated as legitimate. If solidarity with Palestinians can be attributed to demographic change rather than a response to conditions in Gaza, attention shifts away from the actions of governments and toward the identities of the people raising concerns.

Ceuta should have been remembered as a humanitarian tragedy first. Instead, it became another episode in Europe’s ongoing culture wars, with the deaths of those attempting the crossing receiving less sustained attention than the political narratives built around the event.

When humanitarian disasters get understood primarily through the political narratives they can support rather than the lives lost, the underlying facts risk becoming secondary to political usefulness. Fear stops functioning as a reaction to specific events and starts operating as a standing political framework.

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Trump’s $500 ACA Refund Checks Arrive in Nearly a Million Homes With a Letter Blaming Biden

By George Mensah 4 min read

President Donald Trump’s $500 Affordable Care Act refund checks have started arriving at the homes of nearly a million Americans. Each check comes with a letter that blames the Biden administration for overcharging recipients. The checks reach people who buy ACA coverage without subsidies, and they arrive ahead of the midterm elections.

USA Today reported on the letters. They tell recipients: “For years, the Biden Administration overcharged you to fund the operation of HealthCare.gov. That money belongs to hard-working Americans, not the Government, and now, I am returning it to you!”

An MS NOW opinion column examined the letter’s claims and found they mix a small amount of fact with a framing the column describes as misleading. This article separates what the record shows from what the letter asserts.

Who receives the checks

The refund goes to Americans who do not receive subsidies to help pay for their ACA coverage, according to the letter. It tells them: “You have paid into this flawed System, and now you are finally getting something back.”

The letter closes with Trump saying he is “fighting to put the American people FIRST.”

Where the money comes from

The checks draw on a government fund that health insurance companies pay into. The fund covers the operating costs of the ACA marketplace, including marketing, outreach and enrollment assistance. According to the MS NOW column, insurers pass part of those fees on to customers, which pushes their premiums higher.

The column says Trump tapped a surplus in that fund that predates his second term.

What the letter says about Biden

Trump has described the surplus as the product of “gross mismanagement” by the Biden administration. The MS NOW column says there is no evidence for that claim and that the surplus may not be the result of Biden’s actions at all.

The Associated Press reported on a more specific possibility. Cynthia Cox, a vice president and director of the ACA program at the nonprofit health research group KFF, said the money could have come from fees collected during Trump’s first term. A KFF analysis found that his first administration collected more user fees from insurers than it spent. That left an estimated $1 billion in unspent funds.

The MS NOW column adds that Trump sharply reduced spending during his first term on efforts to make the ACA marketplace more accessible, which would have contributed to a surplus. It also notes that extra money in a fund does not by itself show wrongdoing. The column does not name a source for the first-term spending cut.

Premiums for the people getting the checks

Congressional Republicans declined last year to extend ACA subsidies. According to the MS NOW column, people in the group eligible for Trump’s checks have seen premium increases that often run to thousands of dollars. For many of them, the column says, $500 would not cover the cost difference for one month of coverage.

The New York Times reported that roughly 3 million people were priced out of ACA plans after the subsidies lapsed. Those people do not qualify for the refund checks.

A political argument over the checks

The MS NOW column calls the checks “a cynical ploy” aimed at voters ahead of the midterms. It argues that Trump has raised healthcare costs, increased profits for health insurers and has not proposed an effective plan to expand coverage. Those are the column’s opinions. The article does not include a response from the White House.

The facts in the record are narrower. The checks are going out. The money comes from a fund insurers finance. Trump’s letter credits his own action and blames Biden. KFF’s analysis shows the surplus may have grown in part during Trump’s first term. Millions of people who lost subsidized coverage will not receive a check.

What to watch

Nearly a million recipients have started receiving the checks. Many of them still face higher premiums than they did before the subsidies lapsed. The public record does not yet show how much of the fund’s surplus came from which administration. That question is likely to stay open through the midterms.

Opinion

To reclaim its sovereignty, Senegal must approach debt differently

By George Mensah 6 min read

Senegal and the International Monetary Fund agreed on September 1 to a three-year loan programme worth about $2.2 billion. The deal comes with a condition: Senegal must seek relief from its creditors through the G20 Common Framework. A recent opinion article argues that the government is making a mistake by treating the IMF as its only option, and it lays out a different plan built around a citizen debt audit, new limits on borrowing and a coalition of African debtors.

The agreement is a staff-level deal, so the IMF’s executive board still has to approve it. Here is what the deal covers, what the author proposes instead, and what the evidence says about both.

What the IMF agreement covers

The programme is a 36-month Extended Credit Facility worth roughly $2.2 billion, according to Credendo. Final approval depends on corrective action on debt management and fiscal reforms, and on firm financing assurances from Senegal’s creditors. The IMF must also finish a debt sustainability analysis to decide how much relief the country needs.

The new deal replaces a $1.8 billion programme that the IMF suspended after the hidden debt came to light, Africanews reported. Senegal’s finance ministry said that reducing debt-related vulnerabilities was urgent and necessary to restore the state’s ability to fund its priorities. Eurobonds fell after the announcement, Bloomberg reported, and Credendo said the drop shows markets expect creditor losses.

How the hidden debt surfaced

A state audit in 2024 revealed that the government of former President Macky Sall had misreported loans. Public debt rose beyond 130 percent of GDP. Senegal’s Court of Auditors later put end-2023 debt at 99.7 percent of GDP against the 74.41 percent reported earlier, CNBC Africa reported. The IMF estimated total public sector debt at 132 percent of GDP at the end of 2024.

The size of the hidden borrowing is still debated. AllAfrica reported that more than $11 billion of borrowing had gone unreported, and that some estimates reach $13 billion, which would exceed a quarter of Senegal’s roughly $40 billion economy.

What the commentary argues

The author calls the discovery a betrayal of voters, who had been told their country was a model of stability. The outrage helped the governing Pastef party win 80 percent of parliamentary seats in November 2024, the author writes. Now, the author says, the sovereignty agenda behind that vote is slipping away, not through a formal break but through a change in vocabulary and goals.

The author points to history. Senegal has used IMF programmes since 1979, and the commentary says the structural adjustment that followed brought stagnation and rising poverty. After the country qualified for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in 2004, the author says, $488 million of its debt was cancelled, but it had to accept privatisation and deregulation. The author also cites Zambia, where IMF-backed policies shrank the economy, and Ethiopia, where a restructuring request made in February 2021 was not settled until March 2025. The author says austerity under Ethiopia’s $3.4 billion IMF agreement brought rising poverty and inequality.

On the 2023 debt figures, the author says a gap of 25 percentage points of GDP held over several years was no accident and that the IMF’s own oversight failed. The author concludes that Senegalese voters deserve better than “a better-managed version of structural adjustment,” and says parliament must hold to the mandate it received in 2024.

What the author proposes

The commentary calls for a sequence that puts audits before new conditions:

  • A citizen debt audit of all borrowing from 2019 to 2024, run by parliament and civil society, testing whether each debt was legal, legitimate and useful to the public. It would cover arrangers, creditors and the IMF’s surveillance, with payments on disputed debt suspended while it runs.
  • A tax push aimed at extractive industries and wealthy individuals, rather than across-the-board increases paired with social spending cuts.
  • A minimum share of state investment for infrastructure, agro-industrial transformation and energy, and public caps on the Total Return Swaps tied to domestic debt.
  • Hydrocarbon revenue safeguards: a stabilisation fund, an investment envelope, active management of the costliest external debt, and parliamentary oversight.
  • A law requiring parliament to authorise and publish every public borrowing.

Beyond Senegal, the author wants a South-South coalition. The author recalls Burkinabe President Thomas Sankara telling the Organisation of African Unity in July 1987 that creditors coordinate, so borrowers should too. The Borrowers’ Platform, set up in April, would narrow the information gap between creditors and debtors and develop common positions on conditions. With the African Union, Senegal would push for a binding 20-to-30-year moratorium on debt service, with freed funds spent on development priorities set by national parliaments. The author grounds the idea in a 1962 UN General Assembly resolution affirming that peoples hold inalienable authority over their natural wealth. The author also urges regional pooling of liquidity risk in the West African Economic and Monetary Union and a process, with other CFA franc users, to create a new currency.

Where the government stands, and the counter-arguments

Senegal’s leadership has not spoken with one voice. Africanews reported that President Bassirou Diomaye Faye favours a more conciliatory approach with the IMF, while his then prime minister, Ousmane Sonko, rejected debt restructuring. Faye met IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva in Washington to discuss the reform programme, according to Pan African Visions. Moody’s downgraded Senegal’s long-term foreign-currency rating to Caa2 from Caa1 during the talks.

Supporters of the IMF route point to what it unlocks. Credendo said the agreement should help release funding from multilateral lenders such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank. The IMF’s Julie Kozack said the fund could approve a programme before the debt reprofiling is finished, according to Briefs. S&P Global Ratings said on September 24 that Senegal’s plan to restructure foreign-currency debt would not hurt rated banks in sub-Saharan Africa.

The evidence also complicates one proposal. The IPS Journal reported that most of the hidden debt consists of CFA franc loans, which sits uneasily with the claim that foreign-currency borrowing is driving up debt payments. Reporting so far shows no creditor backing for a binding moratorium.

IMF data cited by Pan African Visions show who is owed money. Senegal owes about $2.98 billion to the World Bank, $4.05 billion to Eurobond investors, $1.23 billion to China Exim Bank, $991 million to the IMF and $872 million to France’s development agency. Those creditors will shape any relief terms. CNBC Africa reported in December 2025 that the IMF was continuing an internal investigation into how it failed to detect the unreported debt.

What comes next

The IMF must complete its debt sustainability analysis and secure board approval. Creditors, including China and France, which hold almost three-quarters of Senegal’s bilateral debt according to the IPS Journal, must agree to relief terms. Parliament, which the author wants to lead, will have a say in whether an audit comes before any new conditions take effect.

The two sides disagree on sequence. Senegal’s finance ministry has called reducing debt vulnerabilities urgent. The commentary’s author puts accountability first.

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