Saudi Arabia Issues Security Alerts in Mecca and Jeddah as Iran-Aligned Attacks Escalate

A fresh dispute has broken out over the state of a possible Ukraine energy ceasefire, after US President Donald Trump claimed that Russia and Ukraine had mutually agreed to stop striking each other’s energy infrastructure — a claim Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy quickly disputed. The disagreement, which surfaced on September 15, 2026, highlights just how far apart the two sides remain on the details of any energy truce, even as diesel prices climb and pressure mounts on all sides to find a way to de-escalate the war. What Trump Claimed About the Ukraine Energy Ceasefire On Monday, Trump posted on social media that Moscow and Kyiv had both agreed to halt strikes on energy infrastructure. He linked the announcement to the recent spike in diesel prices, arguing that the attacks — rather than broader instability tied to the war in Iran — were the real driver behind the surge. Diesel prices in the US have climbed to record highs in recent weeks, and Trump appeared eager to frame a pause in energy strikes as a way to ease that pressure while also presenting it as a diplomatic win. The claimed Ukraine energy ceasefire fits a broader pattern from the Trump administration, which has repeatedly floated ceasefire announcements and partial deals over the course of the war, not all of which have held up once Kyiv and Moscow weighed in independently. Zelenskyy’s Response Zelenskyy didn’t confirm Trump’s version of events. In a social media post, the Ukrainian president said no final deal had actually been reached, and laid out the condition under which Kyiv would actually agree to stand down: Russia would need to genuinely stop striking Ukraine’s electricity grid, other energy facilities, critical infrastructure, and food supply routes, with guarantees from Ukraine’s partners that this commitment would hold. He was blunt about Kyiv’s underlying skepticism, writing that Ukraine remains unconvinced Russia is willing to abide by any agreement it signs. A Ukrainian official also pushed back directly on the idea that Moscow had signed off on anything, telling reporters that despite Trump’s assertion of a mutual agreement, Russia had not actually agreed to it. That distinction matters. Trump’s post implied a done deal between the two warring parties. Zelenskyy’s response makes clear that, from Kyiv’s perspective, any Ukraine energy ceasefire is still very much a proposal on the table rather than an active agreement. Markets Weren’t Convinced Either Financial markets responded to the news of a possible Ukraine energy ceasefire with notable skepticism. Diesel futures initially ticked up on Trump’s announcement but pared those gains as the session went on in choppy trading, ultimately settling around 1% higher on the day — a muted reaction for what was billed, according to CNBC’s coverage of the claim, as a major diplomatic breakthrough. US retail diesel prices, meanwhile, remained at record highs. Analysts were similarly cautious. Rachel Ziemba, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, said she would put far more weight on confirmation directly from Ukraine and Russia than on Trump’s own characterization of the situation, as she told Energy Connects. She also pointed out a practical wrinkle: even if strikes on refineries stopped, that alone might not be enough to meaningfully bring down prices if other bottlenecks, such as blocked Gulf shipping channels, remain in place. In other words, even a genuine ceasefire on energy strikes might not translate into the kind of quick price relief Trump’s announcement implied. Why Energy Infrastructure Has Become a Flashpoint To understand why this specific issue keeps resurfacing in ceasefire talks, it helps to look at how central energy infrastructure has become to the war itself. Russia has waged a sustained campaign against Ukraine’s power grid for years, targeting thermal power plants, substations, and district heating facilities, particularly ahead of winter months when the impact on civilians is most severe. Ukraine, in turn, has shifted much of its own long-range strike strategy toward Russian oil refineries, storage terminals, and export infrastructure — aiming to squeeze the revenue that helps fund Moscow’s war effort. Because both sides have leaned so heavily on energy strikes as tools of pressure, any Ukraine energy ceasefire covering energy infrastructure would represent a meaningful de-escalation — but it would also require both militaries to give up a strategy they’ve each found effective. That’s part of why previous energy-related truce attempts earlier in the war didn’t hold cleanly, with both sides accusing the other of violations shortly after announcements were made. A Pattern of Disputed Ukraine Energy Ceasefire Claims This isn’t the first time a Trump-announced ceasefire element has run into daylight between Washington’s framing and the reality on the ground. Earlier in the war, after Trump spoke separately with both Putin and Zelenskyy, the two sides appeared to align around a partial ceasefire covering energy and civilian infrastructure. Even then, the specifics were murky: US officials described the agreement in narrower terms than Zelenskyy did in his own public statements, and within days Ukraine was reporting fresh Russian strikes on its energy grid despite the supposed pause. That earlier episode is a useful reminder that this current Ukraine energy ceasefire dispute fits a pattern — verbal agreements reached in phone calls or described secondhand by US officials have a track record of falling apart once both militaries are back in the field. It also explains why Zelenskyy, this time around, was quick to publicly clarify the terms rather than simply let Trump’s framing stand. What Would a Real Ukraine Energy Ceasefire Take? Based on Zelenskyy’s own statements, a credible Ukraine energy ceasefire would need to include a few key elements: Verified reciprocity — not just an announcement, but confirmation from both Kyiv and Moscow that they’ve independently agreed to the same terms. A broad definition of protected infrastructure — covering not just oil refineries but the electricity grid, other energy facilities, critical infrastructure, and food supply routes.  Guarantees from Ukraine’s partners — some mechanism, likely involving the US or other allies, to hold Russia accountable if strikes resume. A durable timeframe — given that past ceasefire attempts have collapsed within days, any new agreement would need enforcement mechanisms strong enough to survive early testing. Until those pieces are in place, Ukrainian officials appear determined to treat any US-announced ceasefire as aspirational rather than operative. How This Fits Into the Broader Peace Process This dispute doesn’t exist in isolation — it’s the latest chapter in a peace process that has moved in fits and starts for much of the year. Trump has held multiple calls with both Putin and Zelenskyy, often describing each conversation as a step closer to a lasting resolution, while facilitating occasional prisoner exchanges and narrower agreements along the way. But full ceasefire talks have repeatedly stalled over disagreements about territory, security guarantees, and — as with this Ukraine energy ceasefire dispute — the scope of what’s actually being agreed to. Energy infrastructure sits at an unusual intersection in these talks. Unlike broader territorial or security questions, a mutual pause on energy strikes is, in theory, one of the more achievable steps toward de-escalation, since it doesn’t require either side to make concessions on the front line. That’s likely part of why it keeps resurfacing as a proposed starting point. But it also means any breakdown in an energy-specific truce carries outsized symbolic weight — if the two sides can’t hold even a narrow, mutually beneficial pause, it raises doubts about their ability to manage more complex parts of a broader deal. The Bigger Picture This latest dispute is less about a single miscommunication and more about the ongoing gap between how the Trump administration talks about progress toward peace and how that progress is actually experienced by Ukraine and Russia on the ground. For Trump, framing the situation as a resolved deal serves an immediate political purpose — tying it to easing diesel prices and demonstrating diplomatic momentum. For Zelenskyy, publicly correcting the record is about protecting Ukraine’s negotiating position and making clear that any de-escalation is conditional, not automatic. For now, the state of the Ukraine energy ceasefire remains unresolved. Strikes on both sides’ energy infrastructure have not stopped, markets are treating the announcement with caution, and the core disagreement — whether Russia has actually agreed to anything — remains unanswered. Whether this develops into an actual, verified pause in strikes, or fades the way earlier partial ceasefire claims have, will likely become clearer in the days ahead as both Kyiv and Moscow respond more formally. Final Thoughts on the Ukraine Energy Ceasefire Dispute The back-and-forth over this claimed Ukraine energy ceasefire underscores a recurring dynamic in the Russia-Ukraine peace process: announcements often move faster than actual agreements. Until Russia confirms specific terms and Ukraine sees consistent follow-through on the ground, statements about ceasefires — however confidently made — are likely to be met with the same caution Zelenskyy and financial markets showed this week.

A fast-moving Houthi offensive in Yemen has put the Iran-aligned militants within reach of controlling one of the world’s most critical oil shipping routes, adding a new layer of difficulty to President Donald Trump’s ongoing war with Iran, now in its seventh month. Houthi fighters have pushed south along Yemen’s coastline in recent days, expanding their reach toward the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, sometimes called the “Gate of Tears,” at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Control of that passage would give Tehran leverage over both of the region’s major oil corridors at once. On Friday, Houthi forces reached the island of Perim, positioned in the middle of the strait between Yemen and the African coast. The advance is particularly troubling for Saudi Arabia, which has relied heavily on Red Sea ports to ship its oil since the war closed off much of the Strait of Hormuz on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula. A Setback for Trump’s Pressure Strategy The timing complicates matters further for Trump, who is already dealing with record-low approval ratings and looking for an exit from the broader conflict. He recently unveiled an economic pressure campaign meant to squeeze concessions out of Iran’s government. Rising U.S. gasoline prices tied to the war have put his Republican Party’s hold on Congress at risk ahead of the November midterm elections. Iran, despite sustaining serious military and economic damage, has shown no sign of backing down. “Just weeks ago, Trump adopted a strategy of squeezing Iran’s economy while keeping military conflict at levels too low to squeeze the American economy,” said Stephen Wertheim, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “The Houthis have shattered Trump’s plan.” Washington Weighs the Cost of Getting Involved The U.S. cannot easily accept a scenario where the Houthis shut down the strait, spiking energy prices and disrupting global trade. But taking direct military action against a group that has already outlasted attacks from both Saudi Arabia and the United States would pull American forces into a new and risky mission at a moment when the military is already committed to the fight with Iran. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman called Trump on Thursday to request U.S. military assistance against the Houthis, according to three sources who spoke with Reuters. The sources said Washington told him it would not intervene directly for now, offering intelligence support instead. Trump confirmed the call on Saturday. He said the Houthis had also reached out to his administration, asking that Washington stay out of the conflict directly. A senior Trump administration official would not answer specific questions about the situation but said the U.S. remains focused on protecting freedom of navigation in the Red Sea “while empowering our regional partners to take the lead in managing and resolving regional security challenges.” Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Houthis did not respond to requests for comment. Iran’s foreign ministry said Thursday that the conflict in Yemen cannot be resolved through blockades or military strikes against the Houthis and called instead for dialogue, without addressing Iran’s own involvement in the group’s operations. Two Choke Points Under Pressure Iran already retaliated against U.S. and Israeli strikes earlier this year by disrupting traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, a passage that once carried roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply. If the Houthis succeed in closing the Bab el-Mandeb as well, that would threaten another 7 percent of global petroleum supplies and about 12 percent of global trade. “This was always the worst-case scenario, that the Iranians exert control not only of Strait of Hormuz but Bab el-Mandeb, two of the leading energy choke points in the world,” said David Schenker, who served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs during Trump’s first term and now works at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “It’s an enormous amount of leverage that [the Iranians] have in hand,” Schenker said. Analysts and former officials say Trump faces a difficult decision: commit U.S. forces and limited air-defense munitions to repelling the Houthis, or leave the fight to Saudi Arabia and its allies, including a Yemeni government based in the south of the country. The Houthis have held Yemen’s capital for 12 years, surviving a Saudi-led military campaign that has failed to remove them from power. Ending an Existing Truce Would Carry Risks A U.S. move against the Houthis would also unravel an arrangement Trump reached last year, under which Washington agreed to stop bombing the group in exchange for an end to Houthi strikes on Red Sea shipping. Breaking that deal would likely expose American forces to missile fire from Yemen. It would also place additional strain on a U.S. military already stretched thin. Officials say confronting the Houthis would demand substantial naval and air resources, along with intelligence assets needed to track Houthi positions that have shifted considerably since last year’s ceasefire. A sustained campaign against Houthi drones and missiles could also draw down already limited U.S. stockpiles of munitions and air-defense interceptors. The senior administration official rejected the idea that resource constraints were a concern. “The United States Military has more than enough munitions, ammo, and stockpiles to serve all of the Commander-in-Chief’s strategic goals and beyond,” the official said. Tim Lenderking, who served as U.S. special envoy for Yemen under former President Joe Biden and now works as a principal at the law firm Squire Patton Boggs, said Trump’s reluctance to intervene militarily means Washington needs to increase intelligence sharing with Saudi Arabia’s air campaign and boost diplomatic and material support for Yemen’s internationally recognized government. “This administration came in asking the question, ‘What can Yemen do for us?’” Lenderking said during a webcast hosted by the Middle East Institute in Washington. “Well, Yemen can spoil our day.”

Chinese President Xi Jinping called on the BRICS bloc to act as a peacemaker in the Middle East during an address to member countries gathered in New Delhi on Saturday. China will work alongside other BRICS members in that role, Xi said, because the ongoing war “does not serve the common interests of the international community.” State broadcaster CCTV carried the remarks. BRICS started in 2009 with five founding members: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The group later added Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Its original goal was to offer developing nations a counterweight to a world order shaped largely by the United States and its Western allies. Today, BRICS members make up more than 40 percent of the world’s population and close to a quarter of the global economy. Xi Frames BRICS as a Global South Leader Xi described the bloc as a “leading group” within the Global South and pointed to it as an example of self-reliance for emerging and developing economies. He said the group should push harder toward innovation-driven growth. China will take over the BRICS chairmanship next year and host the 19th BRICS summit, CCTV reported. Xi and Modi Meet on Summit Sidelines Xi also met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during the summit. According to state news agency Xinhua, Xi told Modi that China views its relationship with India through a “strategic, long-term perspective.” Xinhua quoted Xi saying the two countries can learn from each other’s strengths and pursue shared development together. The meeting marked Xi’s first visit to India in seven years. Analysts say the trip may help move the diplomatic relationship between the two neighbors forward, though little evidence yet points to any real improvement in business ties between them. A Relationship Shaped by Old Tension China and India share a difficult history. The two countries fought a brief war in 1962, and that conflict has colored their relationship for decades since. Tensions flared again after a border skirmish in 2020 left 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers dead. Despite that history, ties between the two countries have eased somewhat in recent years. Modi traveled to China last year, a visit that helped set the stage for warmer contact. Both nations are also navigating unpredictable relationships with Washington, which may be pushing them toward closer coordination with each other. BRICS Summit Continues Broader Diplomatic Push Xi’s remarks on the Middle East come as BRICS leaders work through a joint declaration during the New Delhi gathering. The bloc has increasingly positioned itself as a platform for countries outside the traditional Western alliance system to coordinate on global conflicts and economic policy. For China, the summit offers a chance to reinforce its role as a leading voice among developing nations while also managing a delicate bilateral relationship with India. The upcoming Chinese chairmanship of BRICS next year gives Beijing an opportunity to shape the bloc’s priorities directly, including how it approaches conflicts like the one in the Middle East. Whether BRICS can meaningfully influence the Middle East war remains an open question. The bloc includes Iran, one of the parties most directly affected by the conflict, alongside countries like Brazil and South Africa that have taken more distant diplomatic positions on the issue. Modi’s government, meanwhile, continues to balance its own relationships with the United States, Russia and China. The New Delhi summit puts that balancing act on public display, with Xi’s visit serving as one of the most closely watched moments of the gathering. No immediate details emerged on what concrete steps BRICS members might take toward peacemaking in the Middle East, or how member states with differing interests in the region might coordinate such an effort.

Ukrainian military mechanic “Chimera” spends his days in a small workshop near the front line in northeastern Ukraine, preparing four-wheeled robots for combat. His unit calls them “Hyenas.” Loaded with explosives, they roll toward Russian positions to hit dugouts or stop enemy advances before a single soldier steps into the open. Chimera, 44, asked to be identified only by his call sign. He said similar unmanned ground vehicles, or UGVs, have already forced Russian soldiers to surrender. “Imagine what 20 kilograms (44 pounds) of explosives is like: it’s very powerful,” he said. “Very powerful.” His workshop belongs to Ukraine’s Third Army Corps, one of dozens of similar operations that have opened along the 1,200-kilometer (745-mile) front line. Kyiv’s military, outnumbered by Russian infantry, is turning to robotics to close the gap in personnel five years into the war. A Weapon Built to Save Lives Unmanned ground vehicles now sit at the center of Ukraine’s plan to protect its troops. On a battlefield saturated with surveillance drones, exposed movement often draws immediate fire. Most Ukrainian brigades and regiments run dedicated unmanned systems units, and those units are adding ground vehicles to their existing drone fleets. Reuters visited NC13, a unit under the Third Army Corps that specializes in combat use of these machines, to see how the technology is changing how Ukraine fights on land. Inside the workshop, mechanics work on a mix of experimental designs. Some run on tracks, others on wheels. One carries a hose for putting out fires. Another holds a rack built to launch portable rockets. Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi commands the Third Army Corps. He calls the shift toward UGVs the next major turn in the war, following the earlier rise of aerial drones. His corps, regarded as one of Ukraine’s strongest fighting forces, aims to replace about a third of its frontline infantry with machines by the end of the year. “The West slept through the (drone) revolution in many ways,” Biletskyi said. He added that infantry soldiers now handle only about 10 percent of the tasks they once did, before aerial threats made constant movement dangerous. “If the West really wants to not just keep up with the times, but to get slightly ahead, it needs to think about the next revolution,” he said. Machines on the Supply Line In Donetsk region’s so-called fortress belt, ground drones have become a regular sight, hauling ammunition and rations into besieged towns and carrying wounded soldiers out. Ukraine’s defence ministry said in June that these vehicles had completed more than 50,000 logistics and evacuation missions so far this year. At NC13’s command post, set up in a basement in Ukraine’s Kharkiv region, operators sit at rows of screens, controllers in hand, watching black-and-white video feeds from the field. The unit was formed last year. On one recent operation, an operator sprayed a tree line with a machinegun mounted on a UGV. Screens glow across the room, and chatter over Discord, the messaging app the team uses to coordinate, fills the air. Deputy commander “Bar” said the unit runs missions almost daily. In one operation, the team loaded three bombs onto a trailer, pulled it onto a bridge used by Russian forces for supply routes, and detonated it. In another, a UGV armed with a machinegun held off an infantry assault while kamikaze drones struck from above. “To me, it’s a wonderful recipe,” said Bar, 23, a former bartender, describing how ground and air drones now work together. He said at least two Russian soldiers have surrendered directly to NC13’s ground vehicles. The machines have real limits. They cannot climb over obstacles the way soldiers can, and they cannot clear a building or a trench. Ukraine also has not produced enough of them to deploy in the large numbers used for aerial drone swarms, Bar said. Even so, the vehicles have started taking over dangerous jobs once assigned to people. “They don’t need food, they don’t need water, they don’t need logs delivered to build shelters,” Bar said. “Basically, we don’t need to feel for them. It’s a hunk of iron sent to do the job we used to send soldiers to do.” A Shift in How Commanders Fight Biletskyi described ground drones as one part of a broader change in warfare, alongside the growing use of artificial intelligence to analyze battlefield data. He said the technology gives human commanders more room to focus on planning and judgment calls rather than direct exposure to risk. That shift could open the door to bolder battlefield decisions, ones that might have cost too many lives to attempt in the past. “War is a creative activity; it’s an art,” Biletskyi said. “Otherwise, a commander is not called a commander, but a butcher.” Ukraine’s former top general, Oleksandr Syrskyi, faced criticism from some service members who described his leadership style as rooted in Soviet-era tactics with a high tolerance for casualties. His successor, Mykhailo Drapatyi, is viewed by many in the military as more willing to protect troops, in part by pushing new technology like UGVs into wider use. Biletskyi himself was promoted last month, taking on a broader role helping oversee the defense of Ukraine’s Donetsk region. Bar, like most members of NC13, served as an infantryman earlier in the war and fought in some of its largest battles. He said the outcome for many of those he served alongside could have been different with today’s technology. If ground drones had existed back then, he said, “a great number of my friends would still be alive.”

Hezbollah vs Hamas is a comparison that comes up constantly in Middle East coverage — if you’ve been following the news, you’ve probably heard the two names mentioned in the same breath, almost like they’re two branches of the same organization. They’re not. The Hezbollah vs Hamas comparison actually reveals two groups with different roots, different religious identities, and different playbooks, even though both end up on the same side of the fight against Israel. Hamas operates out of the Gaza Strip and grew from the Palestinian nationalist movement. Hezbollah is based in Lebanon and grew out of a very different set of circumstances tied to Iran’s Islamic Revolution. Both receive backing from Tehran, both are labeled terrorist organizations by the US and several Western governments, and both have fought bloody wars with Israel. But once you dig past the surface, the Hezbollah vs Hamas story splits into two separate paths worth understanding on their own terms. What Is Hamas? Hamas is short for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, which translates to the Islamic Resistance Movement. The group was founded in 1987 during the First Intifada, the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation, and it grew out of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Its founders, including Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, wanted an organization that mixed Islamist ideology with Palestinian nationalism. Hamas is a Sunni Muslim organization, and its founding charter called for the establishment of an Islamic state across historic Palestine. The group won legislative elections in 2006, then took full control of the Gaza Strip in 2007 after a violent split with its rival, Fatah, which continued running parts of the West Bank instead. From that point on, Hamas functioned as both a governing authority in Gaza and an armed resistance movement, with its military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, carrying out attacks against Israel for decades. Leadership has shifted a lot in the past two years. Longtime political chief Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran in mid-2024, and Yahya Sinwar, the architect of the October 7, 2023 attack, was killed by Israeli forces later that same year. Khalil al-Hayya now leads the group’s political bureau. Under the 2025 Gaza peace plan, Hamas formally stepped back from day-to-day civil administration of Gaza, though disputes over its disarmament continue to stall the next phase of that agreement. What Is Hezbollah? Hezbollah, which means “Party of God” in Arabic, formed in 1982 in the middle of the Lebanese Civil War, right after Israel invaded Lebanon to push out the Palestine Liberation Organization. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps helped train, fund, and organize the new group almost from day one, and that relationship has never really loosened since. Unlike Hamas, Hezbollah is a Shia Muslim organization, drawing much of its support from Lebanon’s Shia population in the south of the country, the Bekaa Valley, and parts of Beirut. It describes itself as a resistance movement against Israeli occupation and Western influence in the region. Over the decades, though, Hezbollah built something far bigger than a militia. It runs hospitals, schools, and social services, and it holds seats in the Lebanese parliament, functioning as a genuine political powerbroker inside Lebanon’s government. Hassan Nasrallah led Hezbollah for 32 years and turned it into arguably the most capable non-state armed actor in the world. Israel killed Nasrallah in a September 2024 airstrike on Beirut, and Naim Qassem, his longtime deputy, took over as secretary-general shortly after. A ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah took effect in late November 2024, though tensions along the border have flared repeatedly since. Hezbollah vs Hamas: How Are the Two Groups Different? The sectarian divide is the starting point of any Hezbollah vs Hamas comparison. Hamas follows Sunni Islam, while Hezbollah follows Shia Islam, and that split shapes almost everything else about the two groups, including their theological outlook and their patron-client relationship with Iran, a Shia-majority state. Geography matters just as much. Hamas is rooted in the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian cause specifically, aiming for Palestinian statehood and the end of Israeli control over Palestinian territory. Hezbollah, on the other hand, operates from Lebanon and frames its mission around resisting Western and Israeli influence across the whole region, not just the Palestinian issue. It rallied behind Hamas after October 7, but Hezbollah’s core purpose was never exclusively about Gaza. Their level of integration into formal politics also diverges quite a bit. Hezbollah holds a real, entrenched role inside Lebanon’s parliamentary system alongside its armed wing. Hamas briefly governed Gaza as a de facto authority, but it never operated as a conventional political party embedded in a functioning national government the way Hezbollah does in Lebanon. What Is the Relationship Between Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and Israel? Iran sits at the center of the Hezbollah vs Hamas relationship, though it holds the reins far more tightly with one group than the other. Hezbollah was essentially built by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, and analysts widely describe it as the most loyal and controlled member of Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance,” a loose network that also includes Yemen’s Houthi movement and various Iraqi militias. Hezbollah’s weapons, training, and much of its funding trace directly back to Tehran. Hamas is different. Iran supplies money, weapons, and training, but Hamas is a Sunni group with its own independent leadership structure and its own decision-making process, so Tehran’s influence over Hamas is real but noticeably looser than its grip on Hezbollah. Both groups, though, share Israel as their primary adversary, and both have called for its destruction at various points in their history, even as their tactics and priorities diverge. Hamas and Hezbollah’s Military Capabilities This is where the gap in the Hezbollah vs Hamas comparison becomes obvious. Hezbollah fields what many analysts consider a small national army rather than a typical militia, with Nasrallah himself once claiming over 100,000 fighters. Its arsenal reportedly includes precision-guided missiles, Russian-made Yakhont and Chinese Silkworm anti-ship missiles with ranges stretching past 180 miles, and a substantial drone fleet used for both surveillance and strikes. Years of fighting alongside Iranian and Russian forces in Syria also gave Hezbollah fighters real battlefield experience. Hamas relies on a different approach. Its Qassam Brigades built an extensive underground tunnel network beneath Gaza, used for storing weapons, moving fighters, and sheltering hostages, alongside shorter-range rockets and small arms. Hamas leans heavily into asymmetric warfare and urban combat rather than the kind of longer-range precision arsenal Hezbollah has assembled. Israel’s military campaigns since 2023 and 2024 have degraded both groups’ capabilities substantially, killing senior commanders and destroying large stockpiles of weapons. A History of Hamas and Hezbollah’s Conflict With Israel Hezbollah’s most defining clash with Israel came in the 2006 Lebanon War, a 34-day conflict triggered by a cross-border raid that killed and captured Israeli soldiers. Hamas, meanwhile, has fought Israel repeatedly since taking control of Gaza, including major rounds of fighting in 2008-09, 2014, and 2021. Year Event 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war in Lebanon 2008-09 Israel-Hamas conflict (Gaza) 2014 50-day Gaza war Oct 2023 Hamas-led attack on southern Israel; Gaza war begins Sept-Nov 2024 Israel kills Nasrallah; Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire Oct 2024 Israel kills Yahya Sinwar Oct 2025 Gaza peace plan ceasefire takes effect 2026 Disarmament talks continue amid disputes Everything changed on October 7, 2023, when Hamas launched a coordinated assault on southern Israel, killing roughly 1,200 people and taking around 250 hostages back into Gaza. Israel’s retaliation turned into the deadliest war in the territory’s history. Hezbollah opened a second front along the Lebanese border soon after in solidarity with Hamas, which eventually escalated into a full Israeli ground and air campaign that killed Nasrallah and much of Hezbollah’s senior leadership by late 2024. A ceasefire with Hezbollah followed in November 2024, and a phased Gaza peace plan between Israel and Hamas took effect in October 2025, though disarmament remains a sticking point well into 2026. Why Hamas and Hezbollah Matter in the Wider Middle East Conflict Neither group operates in isolation. Both function as pieces of Iran’s broader regional strategy, which also leans on Yemen’s Houthis and various militias in Iraq and Syria to pressure Israel and US interests without Tehran directly entering a war itself. When Hamas and Hezbollah act together, or even just rhetorically support each other, the risk of a wider regional war involving Iran, Israel, and potentially the United States rises sharply. The Hezbollah vs Hamas dynamic also shapes Lebanese and Palestinian domestic politics far beyond the battlefield. Hezbollah’s grip on southern Lebanon complicates any lasting peace deal with Israel, and Hamas’s post-war role in Gaza’s governance remains a central unresolved question in the current ceasefire negotiations. Neither conflict can really be settled without addressing the other, which is part of why global powers keep treating them as connected crises rather than separate regional disputes. For background on how each group is officially classified, both are listed on the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organizations register, and independent backgrounders from the Council on Foreign Relations cover each group’s origins in more depth: U.S. State Department: Foreign Terrorist Organizations CFR Backgrounder: What Is Hamas? CFR Backgrounder: What Is Hezbollah? Hamas vs Hezbollah: Key Similarities and Differences Here’s the full Hezbollah vs Hamas comparison in one place: Category Hamas Hezbollah Founded 1987 1982 Sect Sunni Islam Shia Islam Base Gaza Strip Lebanon Iran relationship Backed, less controlled Backed, tightly controlled Political role Formerly governed Gaza Seats in Lebanese parliament Military style Tunnels, urban warfare Precision missiles, drones, larger force Current leader Khalil al-Hayya Naim Qassem Shared goal Opposing Israel Opposing Israel Frequently Asked Questions Are Hamas and Hezbollah the same organization? No. They’re separate groups with different founding histories, different religious sects, and different bases of operation, even though they share Iranian backing and hostility toward Israel. Does Iran control both groups equally? Not really. Iran built Hezbollah from the ground up and maintains close command over it, while Hamas receives Iranian support but keeps more independent decision-making. Which group is militarily stronger? Hezbollah generally fields a larger, better-armed force with longer-range missiles and more battlefield experience, though both groups have suffered major losses since 2023. Do Hamas and Hezbollah work together? They coordinate at times and share a common enemy in Israel, but they don’t operate under a single unified command, and each group sets its own strategy. What’s the current status of conflicts involving these groups? A ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah has held since late 2024 with occasional flare-ups, while the Israel-Hamas ceasefire under the 2025 Gaza peace plan remains fragile, with disarmament negotiations still unresolved in 2026.